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From about 1964 until 1972, American society witnessed an unprecedented number of groups acting in insurgent fashion. By insurgency we mean organized attempts to bring about structural change by thrusting new interests into decisionmaking processes. Some of this insurgency, notably the civil rights and peace movements, had begun somewhat earlier, but after 1963 there were organized attempts to bring about structural changes from virtually all sides: ethnic minorities (Indians, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans), welfare mothers, women, sexual liberation groups, teachers and even some blue-collar workers. The present study isolates and analyzes in detail one of these insurgent challenges-that of farm workers-in an effort to throw light on the dynamics that made the 1960s a period of dramatic and stormy politics.
Our thesis is that the rise and dramatic success of farm worker insurgents in the late 1960s best can be explained by changes in the political environment the movement confronted, rather than by the internal characteristics of the movement organization and the social base upon which it drew. The salient environment consisted of the government, especially the federal government, and a coalition of liberal support organizations. We shall contrast the unsuccessful attempt to organize farm workers by the National Farm Labor Union from 1946 to 1952 with the strikingly successful one of the United Farm Workers from 1965 to 1972.
The immediate goals of both movements were the same-to secure union contracts. They both used the same tactics, namely, mass agricultural strikes, boycotts aided by organized labor, and political demands supported by the liberal community of the day. Both groups encountered identical and virtually insurmountable obstacles, namely, a weak bargaining position, farm worker poverty and a culture of resignation, high rates of migrancy and weak social cohesion, and a perpetual oversupply of farm labor, insuring that growers could break any strike.
The difference between the two chal-lenges was the societal response that insurgent demands received. During the first challenge, government policies strongly favored agribusiness; support from liberal organizations and organized labor was weak and vacillating. By the time the second challenge was mounted, the political environment had changed dramatically. Government now was divided over policies pertaining to farm workers; liberals and organized labor had formed a reform coalition, attacking agribusiness privileges in public policy. The reform coalition then furnished the resources to launch the challenge. Once underway, the coalition continued to fend for the insurgents, providing additional resources and applying leverage to movement targets. In taking this position, we are arguing that the standard literature on social movements fails to deal adequately with either of two central issues-the formation of insurgent organizations and the outcome of insurgent challenges. Drawing on Gusfield's (1968) summary statement, the classical literature holds in common the following line of argument. See also Turner and Killian (1957; 1972) , Smelser (1962) , Lang and Lang (1961), Kornhauser (1959), Davies (1962; 1969) and Gurr (1970) .
Social movements arise because of deep and widespread discontent. First, there is a social change which makes prevailing social relations inappropriate, producing a strain between the new and the old. Strain then generates discontent within some social grouping. When discontent increases rapidly and is widely shared, collective efforts to alleviate discontent will occur. Though there is disagreement about how to formulate the link between strain and discontent, e.g., subjective gaps between expectations and satisfactions versus emotional anxiety induced by anomie, the central thrust is consistent. Fluctuations in the level of discontent account for the rise of movements and major changes in movement participation.
Recent research, though, has cast doubt on the classic "discontent" formulations. Disorders do not arise from disorganized anomic masses, but from groups organizationally able to defend and advance their interests (Oberschall, 1973; Tilly et al., 1975) . As for relative deprivation, Snyder and Tilly (1972) and Hibbs (1973) have failed to find it useful in accounting for a wide variety of collective disruptions. Nor is it clear that we can use the concept without falling into post hoc interpretations (cf. Wilson, 1973:73-9) . ' In this study, we do not propose to test each of the various "discontent" formulations currently available. A priori, it is rather hard to believe that farm workers' discontent was, for example, suddenly greater in 1965, when the Delano grape strike began, than throughout much of the 1950s when there was no movement or strike activity. Indeed, it seems more plausible to assume that farm worker discontent is relatively constant, a product of established economic relations rather than some social dislocation or dysfunction. We do not deny the existence of discontent but we question the usefulness of discontent formulations in accounting for either the emergence of insurgent organization or the level of participation by the social base. What increases, giving rise to insurgency, is the amount of social resources available to unorganized but aggrieved groups, making it possible to launch an organized demand for change.
As for the outcome of challenges, the importance of resources is obvious. Though the classical literature has rarely dealt with the issue directly, there has been an implicit position. The resources mobilized by movement organizations are assumed to derive from the aggrieved social base. The outcome of the challenge, then, whether or not one adopts a I Shifts in perceptions, treated as central by relative deprivation theorists, in our view would be secondary to the main process-changes in social resources. Gamson (1968; 1975) has put it, the political system should be structurally "permeable," readily incorporating new groups and their interests into the decision-making process. Once organized, groups redressing widely-shared grievances should be able to secure at least some part of their program through bargaining and compromise.3 Yet our evidence shows that farm worker challenges have failed, in part, because of the opposition of public officials, and that a successful challenge depended upon the intervention of established liberal organizations and the neutrality of political elites.
We can then summarize the classical model as follows. (1) Discontent, traced to structural dislocations, accounts for collective attempts to bring about change. (2) The resources required to mount collective action and carry it through are broadly distributed-shared by all sizeable social groupings. (3) The political system is pluralistic and, therefore, responsive to all organized groups with grievances. (4) If insurgents succeed, it is due to efforts on the part of the social base; if they do not, presumably they lacked competent leaders, were unwilling to compromise, or behaved irrationally (e.g., used violence or broke laws).
In contrast, we will argue that (1) discontent is ever-present for deprived groups, but (2) collective action is rarely a viable option because of lack of resources and the threat of repression. (3) When deprived groups do mobilize, it is due to the interjection of external resources. (4) Challenges frequently fail because of the lack of resources. Success comes when there is a combination of sustained outside support and disunity and/or tolerance on the part of political elites. The important variables separating movement success from failure, then, pertain to the way the polity responds to insurgent demands.
Structural Powerlessness of Farm Workers
The major impediment to farm worker unionization has been the oversupply of farm labor, undercutting all attempted harvest strikes. There are few barriers of habit or skill that restrict the entry of any applicant to work in the fields. The result is an "unstructured" labor market, offering little job stability and open to all comers (Fisher, 1953). The fields of California and Texas are close enough to the poverty-stricken provinces of Mexico to insure a steady influx of workers, many of whom arrive by illegal routes (Frisbee, 1975) . Continuous immigration not only underwrites the oversupply of labor, but complicates mobilization by insuring the existence of cultural cleavages among workers.
2 Note also the central role played in pluralistic interpretations by the "discontent" hypothesis. Assuming that all groups have ready access to the resources needed to mobilize, Rose (1967:249) argued: "As soon as a felt need for some social change arises, one or more voluntary associations immediately springs up to try to secure the change." I As the central tenet of pluralist theory, the "permeability" argument can be found in almost any presentation of the view. Dahl (1967:250) argues: "even minorities are provided with opportunities to veto solutions"; Truman's (1951) speculations about "potential groups" and Smelser's (1963:364-79) recommendations to elites for channeling "valueoriented" movements into "norm-oriented" ones both build on the assumption of a flexible political system based on a pluralistic social structure.
Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that a significant number of workers have only a limited economic interest in the gains promised by unionization. The majority of farm workers, both domestic and alien, are short-term seasonal workers. During the early 1960s, farm employment in California averaged less than three months of the year (Fuller, 1967) . This means that a majority of workers are interested primarily in the "quick dollar." Imposition of union restrictions on easy access to jobs would conflict with that interest. And for the vast majority of farm workers, regardless of job commitment or citizenship status, income is so low as to leave little economic reserve for risktaking. Since a major portion of the year's income comes during the brief harvest period, workers are reluctant to risk their livelihood on a strike at that time.
In addition to these structural restraints on collective action, there were the very direct restraints Bringing these considerations to bear on the comparison of farm worker challenges, there is reason to believe that circumstances were slightly more conducive to the mobilization efforts of the UFW. Between 1946 and 1965 farm wage rates rose slightly and a few public welfare benefits were extended, at least within California. Presumably, farm workers were slightly more secure economically by the mid-1960s. More significant, though, were changes in the social composition of the farm labor force. During the late 1940s farm workers in California were either "dustbowlers" or Mexican braceros (government-imported contract workers); by the mid-1960s the California farm labor force was predominantly Mexican-descent, short-term workers, most of whom only recently had migrated across the border. Not only were linguistic-cultural cleavages somewhat less pronounced, but these new immigrants were more likely to settle and develop stable community ties than their "Okie" predecessors.
Also, the United Farm Workers pursued a mobilization strategy better designed than that of the NFLU to sustain the participation of farm workers. From its inception, the UFW was an Alinskystyled community organization. The primary advantage was that it offered a program of services and social activities that did not depend upon first securing a union contract. Members developed an attachment to the organization independent of the immediate gains that might derive from any strike. Though the National Farm Labor Union had taken limited steps in a similar direction, its program remained primarily that of the conventional "business" union, promising wage gains and better working conditions rather than social solidarity and community benefits.
But the critical issue is whether differences in either the structural position of farm workers or the mobilization strategy adopted by the movements affected either dependent variable. As we shall see, the impetus for both of the challenges came from the interjection, into an otherwise placid situation, of a professionallytrained cadre backed by outside sponsors. Farm worker discontent remained unexpressed in any organized way until outside organizers arrived on the scene.
As for the question of challenge outcome, despite the UFW's advantages, it experienced no more success in strike efforts than did the NFLU. Where the NFLU had to contend with the semiofficial use of braceros as strikebreakers, the UFW had to deal with vastly increased numbers of illegal aliens and short-term workers crossing the picket lines. The combination of structural constraints and direct controls insured that neither union was able to mobilize a sufficiently massive social base to be effective.
What separated the UFW success from the NFLU failure was the societal re-sponse to the challenges. The NFLU received weak and vacillating sponsorship; the UFW's backing was strong and sustained. Under the pressure of court injunctions and police harassment, the NFLU boycott collapsed when organized labor refused to cooperate. By contrast, the UFW boycotts became national "causes," receiving widespread support from organized labor and liberal organizations; though official harassment remained, the UFW did not deal with the same systematic repression confronted by the NFLU. The success of a "powerless" challenge depended upon sustained and widespread outside support coupled with the neutrality and/or tolerance from the national political elite.
Method
To test this argument we need two bodies of information, one bearing on events leading to the initiation of insurgency and the other dealing with the political environment shaping challenge outcomes. For the first, we have drawn on published accounts of the movements, filled in and corroborated by extensive interviews conducted with movement participants and informed observers. For the second, we have turned to newspaper sources to provide a picture of the societal response to the two challengers. By content coding the abstracts of news stories that dealt with farm labor issues printed in the New York Times over a twentyseven-year period , we can determine the types of groups concerned with the question of farm labor, whether their actions favored the structural changes advocated by insurgents, the types of activities in which they were engaged and, finally, the pattern of interaction prevailing between these various groups during the course of the respective challenges. This way we have a systematic data base against which to test hypotheses bearing on movement-environment interaction.4
As with any data source, there are limits to the Times data. We cannot, for example, use it to test hypotheses on the internal dynamics of mobilization. For this, we have gone to interviews and published sources. Nor, as Danzger's (1975) work has recently indicated, can we view the Times reportage as a complete picture of all insurgent activity and environmental responses to insurgency. Since it is a national newspaper, the New York Times will not provide us with day-to-day coverage, for example, of police repression in Delano, California. Nor can we count on the Times to reveal the hidden bargains and machinations that might underlie public positions and alliances.
We do not ask it to do so. What we are using the Times for is to construct a systematic, reliable index of the publicly visible political activities that formed the environment of each challenge. By comparing statistics drawn from this data base and relating these measures to differences in challenge outcome, we can see if our environmental thesis holds up.5 To see if the New York Times is a reliable source, we have compared the coverage given by the Times with that of two other newspapers, the Chicago Tribune for a more conservative picture and the Los Angeles Times for a more proximate source. After comparing the stories on farm labor carried by these three papers for one month (selected at the peak of activity for the three periods of analysis), we have concluded that the New York Times is basically a more complete version of the same "news." In the month selected from the first period (March, 1951), the New York Times covered seventeen events, only one of which was picked up by each of the other papers; no events in the "test" papers were Finally, there is the question of whether news reportage, regardless of crossvalidation with other news sources, is valid. Danzger (1975) has argued that news coverage is affected by editorial policy, and that systematic error creeps in because the geographic location of national wire service offices produces uneven reportage of relevent events. It is important to note that we code events, not news stories. The prominence given to stories by the editors of the New York Times is irrelevant, as are the evaluations of the events by news personnel. Additionally, our data set should be relatively immune to the main source of error identified by Danzger. Both insurgencies centered in the same locale. Assuming that the corrective mechanisms within the news agencies identified by Danzger were operative, time-series data should be less vulnerable to error than cross-sectional data. Also, we should note the limitations to Danzger's conclusions given his own data base. As Snyder and Kelly (1976) have demonstrated, news-based conflict data dealing with violence appear quite valid; more error exists in nonviolent protest data (employed in Danzger's test). Extending that distinction to our own data set, we can place more confidence in our measures of "concrete" activities than those for "symbolic" ones. The first step is to break down group activity by direction-into actions favorable, unfavorable, ambiguous, or not relevant to the interests of farm workers. (Only government had significant numbers of both favorable and unfavorable actions. All other groups were either wholly favorable or unfavorable. Government was also the only type with a large number of "ambiguous" or "not relevant" actions. These are excluded from the analysis; they do not depart in terms of issue or type of action from "directed" actions.) We then can estimate the balance of favorable/unfavorable actions in the political system during the course of each challenge, and chart the fluctuations in favorable and unfavorable actions by different types of groups (see Figures 1 and 2) .
In addition to group and direction, we are concerned with the form of action adopted. We will distinguish between ' symbolic" and "concrete" actions. Purely rhetorical acts which attempt to shape public opinion, e.g., speeches or hearings, are "symbolic"; actions that attempt to directly allocate control over material resources, e.g., court rulings and mass protest, fall under the rubric of ''concrete.'" Issue is our final variable: (1) labor supply, which is largely centered around the importation of Mexican labor under the bracero and "green card" programs and which was the dominant issue during the NFLU challenge; (2) working and living conditions of farm workers, which dominated the remaining two periods; (3) unionization, i.e., the legality of collective bargaining in agriculture, a question which first appeared in significant measure only during the UFW challenge.
Two types of statistics drawn from this data set will be used. N's, percentages and percent differences set off the rough differences between the three periods of activity. To capture more precisely the divergent patterns of interaction taking place between insurgents and among various groups in the polity, Pearson product-moment correlations are reported. The scores entering the analysis are counts of actions taken by different groups, on different issues, for conventional calendar years. High r's are taken to indicate that considerable concomitant activity took place over the time period between relevant pairs of groups, e.g., insurgents and liberals; low r's, the absence of concomitant activity. Bringing this to bear on the environmental thesis, differences in descriptive statistics and r's for relevant pairings of groups will reveal any differences that existed in the societal response to the challenges.7
Period 1: The NFLU Conflict (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) The first period illustrates in classical terms the obstacles to a sustained and successful farm worker challenge. In addition to the structural constraints restricting farm worker activity, the political environment confronting the insurgents was unfavorable. Government officials at all levels and branches came into the conflict predominantly on the side of the growers, despite the mandate of agencies such as the Department of Labor or the Education and Labor Committees in Congress to protect the interests of deprived groups like farm workers. Though external support was decisive in launching the challenge, it was weak and frequently illfocused, dealing with the consequences rather than the causes of farm worker grievances. When support was withdrawn, the challenge soon collapsed.
Chartered at the 1946 convention of the American Federation of Labor, the Na-7 Contrary to most time-series analyses, controls for auto-correlation are inappropriate. The correlation analysis does not causally relate a dependent variable (e.g., level of insurgent activity) to a set of independent variables (e.g., level of liberal activity). Instead, it is designed to reveal whether significant differences exist between time periods in movement-environment interaction. These differences are then held to account for the divergent outcomes. Instead of asking, "Does liberal activity cause insurgency?" we are asking, "Did insurgent and liberal activities co-occur to a different extent during one challenge than another? Did this -difference relate to different challenge outcomes?" Nor did many of these concrete moves decisively aid the farm worker cause. Key actions, such as pulling strikebreaking braceros out of the fields, did not occur. What, then, are we to make of the fact that 50% of reported governmental actions were coded as favorable to the interest of farm workers? Was government responding to the conflict between insurgents and growers in some even-handed "pluralist" way? Here it is necessary to recall that we are using news media reportage on a social problem and efforts to redress that problem. The news media will be more sensitive to efforts attempting to define or solve that problem than to efforts to maintain the status quo. Consequently, unfavorable actions by government and growers are underrepresented in our data. If only 50% of newsreported government actions can be coded as favorable, then the full universe of governmental activities should, in the balance, be more favorable to growers.
The strength of this assertion is borne out by information on actions favorable to growers. Figure 2 charts these actions for government and growers. The correlation between pro-grower government activities and grower activities is quite high (.75), actually stronger than the respective r for insurgents. In quantitative terms, government was more responsive to agribusiness interests. Clearly, in critical instances, e.g., leaving braceros in struck fields, government policies favored growers over workers.
In addition to the predominantly unfavorable response of government, the NFLU failed to receive sustained, solid support from the liberal community. The major problem was the type of activities in which liberals engaged. When they acted, liberals consistently supported farm workers over growers but they rarely moved beyond symbolic proclamations. Only 24% of liberal actions during the period were concrete. By contrast, 38% during the UFW challenge were so. Even more indicative, though, is the modest level of the correlation between liberal and insurgent activity (.45). What concomitant activity did exist between these two groups involved only symbolic acts (.56 versus -.02 for concrete acts). Looking ahead, the respective r's for the UFW challenge indicate a quite different liberal response. Overall, r was .62; for concrete actions, r was .83 and, for symbolic acts, .06. Where the UFW experienced consistent and concrete support, the NFLU found itself relatively isolated.
Though liberals did not rush to the side of the NFLU, they did play a role in the The late 1950s and the early 1960s, the second Eisenhower administration and the brief Kennedy period emerge from this and other studies in the larger project as a period of germination. Contrary to some interpretations, the remarkable insurgencies of the late 1960s did not originate with the Kennedy administration, but with developments that initially began to appear during Eisenhower's second term. Nor did the Kennedy years witness a dramatic escalation of insurgent activity. Indeed, in the case of farm workers, insurgency showed a decline (Figure 1 ). For our purposes, the two presidential administrations can be treated as a single period, one that witnessed important realignments and shifts in political resources in the national polity, culminating in a supportive environment for insurgent activity.
Farm worker insurgency during the reform period was at a low ebb. Actions by farm worker insurgents dropped from 16% to 11% of all pro-worker activity. In 1956-1957 the NFLU, now renamed the National Agricultural Workers Union (NAWU), secured a small grant from the (Figure 1) . Growers remained publicly inactive and seemingly secure in their position, aroused only at renewal time for the bracero program to lobby bills through Congress. Until the insurgency of Period III began, growers retained a low profile in the Times (Figure 2) . With the direct adversaries largely retired from the public arena, affairs shifted into the hands of government and the liberals. Despite the absence of significant insurgency, the balance of forces in the national polity had begun to shift. Actions favorable to the interests of farm workers increased from 50Wo to 73%, remaining on the same plane (75%) throughout the following UFW period. Beginning during the last years of the Eisenhower administration, three interrelated developments brought about this new supportive environment: (1) policy conflicts within the political elite that resulted in a more "balanced," neutral stance towards farm workers; (2) the formation of a reform coalition composed of liberal pressure groups and organized labor that, in the midst of elite divisions, was able to exercise greater political influence; (3) the erosion of the Congressional power-base of conservative rural interests, stemming immediately from reapportionment.
The concern of liberal pressure groups initially was focused on the need to improve housing and educational conditions of migrant workers. In 1956, the Democratic National Convention included a plank for increased welfare aid to migrants. The next year, the National Council of Churches, already involved in the early civil rights movement in the South, began a study of migrant camp conditions and child labor. In early 1958, the Council brought public pressure to bear on Secretary of Labor James Mitchell to enforce existing laws regarding migrant camps throughout the nation. In late 1958, several liberal pressure groups were joined by the AFL-CIO in attacking the bracero program, scoring administrative laxity, and arguing that federal labor policies were the origin of social problems. The two as yet unrelated issues-poverty and labor policies-were now firmly linked in the public debate.
The fusion of these two issues was significant. Of course, economic conditions already had been linked with social deprivations in public parlance, but the concern of liberal groups in the past had been with inspection of housing, assurances of educational opportunity, and public health measures. To argue now that a public program of importing foreign labor perpetuated the list of conditions deplored by liberals was a substantial change. A second factor contributing to the shift in official actions was the pressure campaign launched by the reform coalition. The effects of the campaign can be captured, in part, from the Times data. Though the correlation between liberal activity and government activity favorable to farm workers is modest (.50), it is considerably higher than during the other periods (.33 for the first and .04 for the third) and it is independent of insurgent activity. Tangible Period II, then, emerges from this analysis as a period of reform and political realignment that dramatically altered the prospective fortunes of insurgents. Reforms, stemming from elite-level conflicts and a pressure campaign conducted by liberal public-interest organizations and organized labor, came about in the virtual absence of activity by farm worker insurgents. The activism of several key liberal organizations depended, in turn, upon broad economic trends, especially the growth of middle-class disposable income that might be invested in worthy causes (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). Insurgents did not stimulate these changes in the national polity. Rather, they were to prove the beneficiaries and, if anything, were stimulated by them.
Period III: The UFW Success (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) During the NFLU period, the number of insurgent actions reported totalled 44. Most of these were symbolic in character, only 27% being concrete. Insurgency was brief, concentrated in a four-year period (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) . However, in the third period, insurgency became sustained. Insurgent actions reached a new peak and remained at a high level throughout the period. A total of 143 actions conducted by farm worker insurgents were recorded. Significantly, 71% of these were concrete in character. By the end of the period, the success of the United Farm Workers was unmistakable. Over a hundred contracts had been signed; wages had been raised by almost a third; union hiring halls were in operation in every major agricultural area in California; farm workers, acting through ranch committees set up under each contract, were exercising a new set of powers.
The key to this dramatic success was the altered political environment within which the challenge operated. Though the potential for mobilizing a social base was slightly more favorable than before, the UFW never was able to launch effective strikes. Though the UFW cadre was experienced and talented, there is little reason to believe that they were markedly more so than the NFLU leadership; neither did the tactics of the challenge differ. The boycotts that secured success for the UFW also had been tried by the NFLU, but with quite different results. What had changed was the political environment-the liberal community now was willing to provide sustained, massive support for insurgency; the political elite had adopted a neutral stance toward farm workers.
As before, external support played a critical role in launching the challenge. Political protest was the mechanism through which much of this support was garnered. By dramatic actions designed to capture the attention of a sympathetic public and highlight the "justice" of their cause, insurgents were able to sustain the movement organization and exercise sufficient indirect leverage against growers to secure contracts. The UFW's use of protest tactics departed from that of rent strikers analyzed by Lipsky (1968; 1970) . Though the basic mechanism was the same (namely, securing the sympathy of third parties to the conflict so that they would use their superior resources to intervene in support of the powerless), the commitments of supporting organizations and the uses to which outside support was put differed. Lipsky found that protest provided unreliable resources, that the news media and sympathetic public might ignore protesters' demands (cf. Goldenberg, 1975) and that, even when attentive, they often were easily satisfied with symbolic palliatives. Though the UFW experienced these problems, the presence of sustained sponsorship on the part of the Migrant Ministry and organized labor guaranteed a stable resource base.
Nor were the uses of protest-acquired resources the same. Lipsky's rent-strikers sought liberal pressure on public officials. For the UFW, protest actions were used to secure contributions and, in the form of a boycott, to exercise power against growers. Marches, symbolic arrests of clergy, and public speeches captured public attention; contributions from labor unions, theater showings and "radical chic" cocktail parties with proceeds to "La Causa" supplemented the budget provided by sponsors and membership dues.
Given the failure of strike actions, a successful outcome required indirect means of exercising power against growers. Sympathetic liberal organizations (e.g., churches, universities, etc.) refused to purchase "scab" grapes. More important, though, major grocery chains were pressured into refusing to handle "scab" products. To exercise that pressure, a combination of external resources had to be mobilized. Students had to contribute time to picketing grocery stores and shipping terminals; Catholic churches and labor unions had to donate office space for boycott houses; Railway Union members had to identify "scab" shipments for boycott pickets; Teamsters had to refuse to handle "hot cargo"; Butchers' union members had to call sympathy strikes when grocery managers continued to stock "scab" products; political candidates and elected officials had to endorse the boycott. The effectiveness of the boycott depended little upon the resources of mobilized farm workers; instead, they became a political symbol. It was the massive outpouring of support, especially from liberals and organized labor, that made the boycott effective and, thereby, forced growers to the bargaining table.
The strength of liberal-labor support for the UFW is indicated by the high level of concomitant activity between insurgents and their supporters. While the correlation of insurgent and liberal activities was modest in Period I (.45), it was strong during the third period (.62). More impor-tant, liberals were far more concrete in their support for insurgents. In the first period, concomitant activities were almost wholly symbolic (.56 versus .02 for concrete activities); during the UFW challenge, it was concrete activities (.81 versus .06 for symbolic activities). Nor do statistical controls for governmental actions favorable to farm workers reduce the correlation (r =.64). Given the fact that liberal activities rarely occurred jointly with pro-worker government activities (r=.04), it is clear that liberals directed their efforts toward supporting insurgents rather than pressuring government.1
The more "balanced," neutral posture of government that was the product of the reform period continued. Sixty-nine percent of all official actions were favorable to farm workers (as against 50% and 68% in Periods I and II). Concretely, this meant that court rulings no longer routinely went against insurgents; federal poverty programs helped to "loosen" small town politics; hearings by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and Congressional committees publicized "injustices" against farm workers; welfare legislation gave farm workers more economic security and afforded insurgents a legal basis to contest grower employment practices. National politicians, such as Senators Kennedy and McGovern, lent their resources to the cause.
The most striking changes in official actions took place on the federal level. Actions favorable to farm workers rose from 46% of federal level activity in the first period, to 63% in the second and 74% in the third. There was, of course, opposition on the part of growers and allied governmental actors. There were numerous instances of police harassment, large-scale purchases of boycotted products by the Department of Defense, and outspoken opposition I Despite the fact that help from organized labor was critical to the boycott's success, our correlations hardly document the point. In the NFLU challenge, r was .08; in the UFW period, .16. This relation is weaker than that for liberal pressure groups, we would argue, because much of the supportive labor action was "local" in character and often went unreported in the Times. 12 Corroborating this interpretation, the correlation between insurgent/liberal actions and proworker government actions is considerably stronger (.74 and .58, respectively) once insurgent and liberal actions are lagged by one year. As a roughly neutral participant, government followed along a year behind the chief partisans, though not responding directly to pressure as before. Though not conclusive, the fact that this was the only instance in the study in which time-lags produced marked increases in r's lends the interpretation some plausibility.
from Governor Reagan and President Nixon.
However, growers had lost their entrenched political position. Public officials no longer acted so consistently to enhance grower interests and to contain the challenge. An indication of the sharpness of the displacement of growers is given by the levels of concomitance between grower actions and pro-grower governmental actions. In Period I, r for grower-government activity was .75; in Period II, .62. But, during the UFW challenge, the correlation dropped to a negligible .05. By the time the United Farm Workers struck in 1965, agricultural employers were no longer able to rely upon government, especially at the federal level, to be fully responsive to their interest in blocking unionization.
Conclusion
The critical factor separating the National Farm Labor Union failure from the United Farm Worker success was the societal response to insurgent demands. In most respects, the challenges were strikingly similar. In both instances, the leadership cadre came from outside the farm worker community; external sponsorship played a critical role in launching both insurgent organizations; both movements confronted similar obstacles to mobilizing a social base and mounting effective strikes; both resorted to political protest and boycotts. What produced the sharp difference in outcome was the difference in political environment encountered. The NFLU received token contributions, vacillating support for its boycott and confronted major acts of resistance by public authorities. In contrast, the UFW received massive contributions, sustained support for its boycotts and encountered a more "balanced," neutral official response.
The dramatic turnabout in the political environment originated in economic trends and political realignments that took place quite independent of any "push" from insurgents. During the reform period, conflicts errupted within the political elite over policies pertaining to farm workers. Elite divisions provided the opening for reform measures then being pressed by a newly active coalition of established liberal and labor organizations. Though the reforms did not directly effect success, the process entailed by reform did result in a new political environment, one which made a successful challenge possible.
If this analysis is correct, then several assumptions found in the classic literature are misleading. Rather than focusing on fluctuations in discontent to account for the emergence of insurgency, it seems more fruitful to assume that grievances are relatively constant and pervasive. Especially for deprived groups, lack of collective resources and controls exercised by superiors-not the absence of discontent-account for the relative infrequency of organized demands for change. For several of the movements of the 1960s, it was the interjection of resources from outside, not sharp increases in discontent, that led to insurgent efforts.
Nor does the political process centered around insurgency conform to the rules of a pluralist game. The American polity had not been uniformly permeable to all groups with significant grievances (cf. Gamson, 1975) . Government does not act as a neutral agent, serving as umpire over the group contest. Public agencies and officials have interests of their own to protect, interests that often bring them into close alignment with well-organized private-interest groups. When insurgency arises threatening these private interests, public officials react by helping to contain insurgency and preserve the status quo.
But if an opposing coalition of established organizations decides to sponsor an insurgent challenge, the normal bias in public policy can be checked. Sponsors then serve as protectors, insuring that the political elite remains neutral to the challenge.
The implications for other challenges are rather striking. If the support of the liberal community is necessary for the success of a challenge by a deprived group, then the liberal community is, in effect, able to determine the cutting edge for viable changes that conform to the interests of those groups still excluded from American politics. Moreover, there is the possibility of abandonment. Since liberal support can fade and political elites shift their stance, as has-happened to the UFW since 1972, even the gains of the past may be endangered. The prospects for future insurgency, by this account, are dim. Until another major realignment takes place in American politics, we should not expect to see successful attempts to extend political citizenship to the excluded.
